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Abstract. While there is general consensus that robust forms of social 
learning enable the possibility of human cultural evolution, the specific 
nature, origins, and development of such learning mechanisms remains 
an open issue. The current paper offers an action-based approach to the 
study of social learning in general and imitation learning in particular. 
From this action-based perspective, imitation itself undergoes learning 
and development and is modeled as an instance of social meta-learning – 
children learning how to use others as a resource for further learning. 
This social meta-learning perspective is then applied empirically to an 
ongoing debate about the reason children imitate causally unnecessary 
actions while learning about a new artifact (i.e., over-imitate). Results 
suggest that children over-imitate because it is the nature of learning 
about social realities in which cultural artifacts are a central aspect. 
Keywords. Social ontology, action-based framework, learning to learn, 
social learning, over-imitation 
Introduction 
Neither humans nor robots can be preprogrammed to competently operate in 
real world environments: there is too much complexity and it cannot be 
anticipated beforehand what will be relevant for successful interaction [1]. 
Instead, both humans and robots must be capable of learning. In the realm of 
social engagements, the issue of preprogramming is even more pronounced 
because the “objects” involved are ontologically emergent from the co-
constituted activity of the participants [2]. Accordingly, participation in a 
socio-cultural world requires that humans and robots be equipped with the 
ability to learn from others (social learning), and, for human-like competence, 
to learn and develop their ability to learn from others (social meta-learning). 
There is general consensus that participation in human culture and 
advances through cultural evolution have depended on the possibility of robust 
forms of social learning. Imitation is widely thought to be one of these robust 
forms of social learning but the specific nature, origins, and development of 
this form of learning garners far less agreement [3,4,5,6,7]. Further, the 
dominant theoretical frameworks in both animal and developmental research do 
not motivate a perspective in which imitation itself involves learning and 
development. In general, humans are not only capable of learning, but also, 
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they are capable of learning to learn (meta-learning) [8]. With respect to social 
forms of meta-learning children are learning how to use others as a resource for 
subsequent (social/individual) learning and development. This perspective on 
imitation as a form of social meta-learning is motivated from within an 
alternative action-based framework for modeling development more broadly 
[9,10]. 
1. An Action-Based Framework: Interactivism 
Theoretical models and assumptions about the nature and origins of 
representation, learning, and development involve sets of mutually constraining 
relations. Using an action-based framework for modeling learning and 
development means being committed to (inter)action as the epistemic ground 
for the emergence of mind [11,12]. From an action-based perspective, 
knowledge is constituted by interactive competence and representation is a 
matter of learning about relevant interactive possibilities. 
Interactivism is a well-developed action-based framework that models the 
origins and ontology of representation, learning, and development for both the 
physical and social world [13,10,14,15]. The interactivist model of physical 
object representation borrows from the work Piaget [12]. For both models, 
physical object representation is constituted by an invariant web of interactive 
possibilities. Any point in the web is reachable from any other point and the 
web remains invariant under a large class of other possible transformations 
(e.g., visible or invisible displacement). 
1.1. Social Agent Representation 
In contrast to physical objects, the interactive possibilities afforded by social 
agents are, largely, not perceptually available. Instead, the interactive 
characterization of a social agent depends, in large part, on that other agent’s 
interactive characterization of you. Consequently, an accurate interactive 
characterization of a social agent is going to require knowing about the broader 
type of situation of which the two agents are major aspects. Accordingly, 
successful interaction and coordination between social agents is made possible 
through the creation, invocation, and maintenance of mutually held interactive 
characterizations of the type of situation – i.e., social realities. In turn, social 
realities provide the basic ontology for learning about and navigating social life 
[2]. 
1.2. Learning and development 
From an action-based perspective, knowledge is constituted by interactive 
competence and, is therefore, inherently active, relational, and necessarily 
constructed through a variation and selection process [10]. In contrast to 
nativism and empiricism, knowledge is not assumed to come from somewhere 
(genes or environment), nor is it assumed to be constituted by some sort of 
correspondence relationship between mind and world [16]. Instead, knowledge 
is actively constructed through the creation of new internal organizations for 
the organism’s possible functioning and internal organizations that enable 
successful interaction with the environment will be selected for. In short, 
learning is modeled as a variation and selection emergent constructivist process 
[11]. 
For organisms that are capable of minimal forms of development, the 
constructive processes can be recursive in that current constructive processes 
can make use of prior constructive processes. In more complex organism, like 
humans, the constructive processes can themselves undergo learning. Such 
organisms will be capable of meta-recursive constructive processes – they will 
be cable of learning to learn [8,14]. From this perspective learning and 
development involve the same underlying dynamics but at different times 
scales. Accordingly, development will be constituted as the properties and 
constraint manifested by the historicities of learning – the ways in which prior 
learning influences future learning [17]. For developmental research this will 
mean designing studies and interpreting results in the developmental context of 
what children have previously learned about the affordances of objects and 
social agents in different types of situations. 
2. Social Meta-Learning 
With respect to social forms of meta-learning children are learning how to use 
others as a resource for subsequent (social/individual) learning and 
development. In general, forms of social meta-learning are going to involve 
issues of the competence and reliability of those others [14]. An early example 
of social meta-learning is when children develop attachment relationships that 
are adapted to specific people in their care-giving environment. Different 
attachment relationships develop to maximize using the adult as an emotional 
resource. Securely attached children are able to consistently use the adult 
caregiver to help make global evaluations about situations and in that sense use 
the adult as a secure base from which to explore their environments. A later 
emerging form of social meta-learning is social referencing. Social referencing 
involves using an adult’s emotional reaction to a particular object or event 
within a specific situation. This emotional reaction provides the child with a 
more specific evaluation about whether to proceed or withdraw from their 
ongoing activity. 
Imitation is a powerful form of social meta-learning that remains 
particularly useful throughout the first 3-4 years of life. For imitation, children 
are learning about how to use adults as a resource for specific engagements 
with the physical, social, and cultural world. However, children must not only 
learn how to imitate another persons’ actions (solving the correspondence 
problem [18]), but also: who to imitate, what to imitate, and when to imitate. 
Further, children must develop the ability to use imitation for different 
functions: learning, play, affiliation, trust, commitment, etc. Finally, social 
meta-learning has renewed importance once children develop sufficient 
language capabilities. “Trust” research has focused on the various cues that 
children learn to use as indicating the reliability of information coming from 
conflicting sources [19]. In general, many of these cues are learned and 
reconciled with other cues at around age 4. For example, a person’s past 
accuracy is recognized as a more relevant cue for predicting their future 
reliability over an affiliation cue like familiarity [20]. 
Having outlined an action-based approach to the representation of social 
realities and the development of social meta-learning, this approach will be 
applied to the empirical study of imitation learning. This application has two 
aspects: first, in contrast to the current conceptual focus on imitation fidelity, 
this approach presupposes a theoretical perspective in which all imitation is 
selective and based on cognitive, motivational, and social-cognitive processes. 
Second, this approach will be used to propose an alternative account for an 
ongoing empirical debate within contemporary imitation research about the 
nature of over-imitation. The paper concludes by suggesting that the current 
action-based framework is adequate to the task of grounding empirical research 
on imitation in a way that more closely resembles the richness of human culture. 
3. The Current Study 
A	  current	  debate	  amongst	   imitation	   researchers	   concerns	   the	  underlying	  
reason	   why	   children	   copy	   the	   causally	   unnecessary	   actions	   of	   an	   adult	  
model	   when	   learning	   about	   novel	   artifacts. For example, children will 
replicate tapping on the top of a box as part of a sequence along with other 
causally necessary steps in their effort to open it. This phenomenon has been 
termed ‘over-imitation’. The current study will use the above social meta-
learning perspective to propose an alternative account for why children over-
imitate? 
3.1. The Debate 
Explanations for why children over-imitate have generally fallen into two 
camps. In	   the	  one	  camp,	  researchers	  have	  argued	   for	  a	  cognitive-­‐learning	  
explanation:	   that over-imitation manifests as a side-effect of a learning 
strategy in which copying all of an adult’s intentional actions is typically 
adaptive [21,22,23].	   That	   is,	   children	   are	   thought	   to	   copy	   the	   causally	  
unnecessary	  actions	  because	   they	  believe	  (mistakenly)	   that	   those	  actions	  
are	  necessary	  to	  open	  the	  box.	  In	  the	  other	  camp,	  researchers	  have	  argued	  
for	  a	  social-­‐motivational	  explanation:	  that	  children	  understand	  the	  adult’s	  
demonstration	  of	   the	  unnecessary	  actions	   to	  be	  an	  opportunity	   for	  social	  
engagement	   [24,25,26].	   That,	   is,	   children	   copy	   the	   unnecessary	   actions	  
because	  they	  want	  to	  interact	  with	  the	  adult.	  
The current perspective agrees with the social-motivational approach that 
children are motivated to interact socially with the adult; however, success at 
such an interaction requires learning. That is, in order to successfully interact 
with the adult, children must learn about this particular social situation of 
which the relatively novel artifact is a central aspect. Consequently, children’s 
over-imitation responses will have less to do with their causal understanding of 
the object and more to do with the culturally relevant object affordances that 
they presume are necessary for successful interaction. From the perspective 
being advocated in the current study, all imitation activity is selective and that 
selectivity always involves both cognitive-learning and social-motivational 
aspects that are themselves relative to the child’s understanding of the broader 
type of situation (social-cognitive aspects). Thus, we propose that learning 
about social realities is the more general phenomenon that is captured by 
standard over-imitation studies. 
3.2. The Study 
In order to test this proposal, we sought to demonstrate how culturally 
relevant object affordances change depending on the type of social situation. 
Seventy-four, predominantly white, middle class children (47 male, 27 female) 
who were 3-5 years old participated in the study. A within-subjects design was 
used that that manipulated the type of social situation and measured children’s 
over-imitation behavior. Specifically, children’s actions during a canonical 
imitation situation were compared with their actions during a subsequent 
helping situation. In the helping situation, opening the box becomes decidedly 
instrumental relative to the ultimate goal of helping an adult. This provided 
children with an opportunity to use whatever they learned about the box (from 
the canonical imitation situation) to accomplish their ultimate goal of assisting 
the adult in the helping situation. It was hypothesized that children would be 
less likely to over-imitate in the helping situation relative to the canonical 
imitation situation. 
3.3. Results and Discussion 
Results indicated that nearly 80% of children in the imitation situation 
over-imitated, while this number dropped to less than 5% in the helping 
situation. This finding is in stark contrast to Lyons and colleagues’ [22,27] 
efforts to demonstrate that over-imitation involves a distortion to the child’s 
causal-belief structure about how the artifact “really” operates. From the 
current perspective, children are learning how to successfully interact in the 
situation. Consequently, learning with respect to the box per se is tied to what 
children are learning about the social interaction that, as a whole, defines the 
situation – i.e., the social reality. 
In general, the culturally relevant interactive affordances of an 
artifact/object are going to change depending on the type of situation that is 
involved. In part, what is culturally relevant about an object depends on one’s 
purposes and these will vary in different types of situations. Findings from the 
current study provided converging evidence that over-imitation in preschoolers 
is less about the causal structure of the box and more about the normative 
structure of the situation as a whole [28,29]. This normative structure (social-
cognitive aspects) helps children to understand the purpose of the situation 
(motivational aspects) as well to define the meaning of the object in the 
situation (cognitive aspects). To put it simply, children are learning that “this is 
what you do to the artifact to participate in the social reality” rather than that 
“this is the necessary causal structure for how to open the box”. 
4. Conclusion 
The current study sought to apply an action-based perspective on social 
realities and social meta-learning to the empirical study of imitation. This 
perspective presupposed an alternative characterization of imitation that 
recognizes the selective nature of all forms of imitation activity. Consequently, 
the current study proceeded to explore the psychological basis for that 
selectivity in a canonical over-imitation setting. In particular, how cognitive 
and motivational aspects were related to the broader type of social situation and 
how they collectively guided children’s imitation activity. The main conclusion 
is that children over-imitate because it is the nature of learning about social 
realities in which artifacts are a culture-relative aspect. 
4.1. What is Special About Imitation Learning? 
Imitation is widely assumed to be a particularly important form of social 
learning because of its contribution to human culture more broadly. However, 
understanding of cultural artifacts does not reduce to the causally necessary 
ways of using objects or even to their instrumental functioning. Instead, 
cultural artifacts are saturated with aesthetics and their functioning is tied to our 
social interests as much as to our “rational” needs. Cultural artifacts are 
constrained by their physical embodiment but attain socio-cultural meaning 
through their contribution to social agents co-constitutive participation in social 
realities (i.e., social ontology). Likewise, social ontology does not reduce to the 
mere presence or absence of social objects that are understood as more 
complex physical objects. Instead, social ontology is emergent from interactive 
systems grounded in the world. Thus, social realities are fundamentally 
constrained by the need for interactive coordination. Although such 
coordination will involve arbitrary aspects (e.g., it does not matter what side of 
the road we drive on), that does not mean that there are no normative 
constraints for understanding what one ought to do to participate in cultural 
activities. That is, rationality and causal necessity do not exhaust the normative 
ground for guiding imitation learning. Accordingly, imitation researchers can 
move beyond their view of artifacts as physical objects to one in which artifacts 
are viewed as culture-relative aspects of social ontology. 
The current action-based perspective offers a robust theoretical framework 
for exploring some of the richness of learning to participate in human culture. 
This framework draws on a model of the basic content of culture in terms 
social ontology and provides a genuinely developmental perspective on those 
learning to participate in such culture. The current empirical work and 
theoretical integration constitute a first step for a promising avenue of research 
in the domain of social meta-learning. Finally, social meta-learning is 
something that roboticists will need to consider if they are to build social 
agents capable of participation in human socio-cultural activities. 
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